Bilateral mutual agreements aim to prevent the same group profits from being taxed in two countries. However, they do not guarantee full tax relief. In its decision of September 2, 2026 (case no. I R 39/23), the German Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhof; BFH) held that the rule on deemed non-deductible business expenses under Section 8b (5) of the German Corporation Tax Act (Körperschaftsteuergesetz; KStG) may apply when implementing a mutual agreement: if excessive sales revenue received by a German parent company is reclassified as tax-exempt income from shareholdings, 5 % of that income is deemed to constitute non-deductible business expenses. The applicable domestic rules for determining taxable income are decisive.
A German stock corporation (AG) supplied goods to foreign companies in which it indirectly held 100 % of the shares. In mutual agreement procedures under the EU Arbitration Convention, the countries concerned agreed on an allocation of profits under which the AG’s profits for the year in dispute, 2008, were too high and those of its subsidiaries were too low. The tax office reduced the AG’s profits accordingly but treated the adjustment amount as a hidden distribution of profits by the subsidiaries. It therefore added back 5 % as non-deductible business expenses. Corporation tax remained at EUR 0; however, the add-back reduced the remaining loss carryforward. Both the Fiscal Court and the BFH upheld this treatment.
The AG’s challenge was ultimately unsuccessful before the BFH as well. Neither the Arbitration Convention nor the mutual agreements themselves confer a direct entitlement to a reduction in profits independently of domestic tax law. Section 175a of the German Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung; AO) likewise merely provides the procedural mechanism for amending tax assessments to implement a mutual agreement; it does not provide an independent legal basis for reducing taxable income.
Where the agreed reductions in profits relate to an excessive price attributable to the shareholder relationship and outside the arm’s length range, the relevant revenue must be reclassified as a hidden distribution of profits constituting tax-exempt income from shareholdings under Section 8b (1) KStG. This necessarily entails a 5 % add-back as non-deductible business expenses. The BFH considers this, in principle, consistent with the objective of eliminating economic double taxation: the Arbitration Convention does not prescribe the form of the corresponding adjustment. In the court’s view, the add-back is a separate adjustment to the deduction of business expenses and does not reverse the agreed relief.
The BFH left open whether the conditions for a hidden distribution of profits were actually met in this case. Without such a distribution, the 5 % add-back would not apply; however, there would also be no legal basis for treating the relevant sales revenue as tax-exempt income from shareholdings through an off-balance-sheet adjustment. The rule prohibiting the Fiscal Court from placing a claimant in a worse position meant that the AG’s legal position could not be worsened. The reduction in profits of 95 % already granted therefore remained unchanged even in that scenario.
Notice:
Companies should examine the domestic legal basis and any potential residual tax burden during the mutual agreement procedure itself. For each company and each year concerned, a reconciliation should clearly show the agreed adjustment amount, its tax treatment and the add-back.

